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Based on a many-industry Chamberlinian-Ricardian trade model with iceberg trade costs, 
this note examines the impact of two modes of economic integration: (1)  a reduction in 
trade costs, and  (2) technical standardization due to information spillover. It is shown that 
these two modes of economic integration have opposing effects on specialization patterns: 
while trade liberalization narrows the range of industries with intra-industry trade, technical 
standardization widens the same range. 
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1 Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, 2-1 Rokkodai-cho Nada-ku Kobe, Japan 
(kikuchi@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp) 1  Introduction 
Two of the most important trends in the global economy in recent decades have been  (1)  
the dramatic decrease in cross-border transaction costs such as transport and 
communication costs, and (2)  the proliferation of economic integration through both 
multirateral and regional agreements.
2 Both reductions in transaction costs and economic 
integration have been associated with an increase in the flow of goods and technical 
information across national boundaries. 
As a result of these changes, a vast literature has developed on the impact of economic 
integration under various settings. Among several competing trade models, Chamberlinian 
monopolistic competition models have been extensively investigated since the 
groundbreaking work of Krugman (1979). To focus on the role of increasing returns and 
imperfect competition, many scholars adopt a standard one-factor monopolistic competition 
trade with cross-country technical homogeneity. In such a model, each firm in the 
monopolistically competitive sector incurs an identical fixed labor requirement and a 
constant marginal labor requirement. As a result, there has been little investigation into the 
impact of economic integration under technical heterogeneity among countries.
3 
                                                   
2 Another important aspect of the global economy is the emergence of international production sharing 
(or fragmentation). See, for example, Jones and Kierkowski (1990), Sim (2004), and Long et al. (2005). 
3 Venables (1987) explores the influence of cross-country technical heterogeneity on trade patterns. 
However, his results are dependent on the asymmetric preferences among countries. Introducing within 
industry technical heterogeneity into the two-good model of economic geography, Forslid and Wooton 
(2003) examine the impact of trade liberalization on location of production. However, Ricardian comparative advantage, which plays a basic role in the traditional 
international-trade context, is worthy of more attention. To address this point, Kikuchi et al. 
(2008) explores cross-country technical heterogeneity in both fixed and variable labor 
requirements as a determinant of trade patterns. Within a two-country, many-industry 
framework, they show that the extent of cross-country technical heterogeneity among 
industries plays an important role as a determinant of intra-industry trade (i.e., two-way 
trade of differentiated products). However, they assume away trade costs, and the impact of 
deeper economic integration is downplayed in the analysis. 
The present note takes the work of Kikuchi et al. (2008) as its point of departure, and 
extends their analysis to include iceberg trade costs. In each industry, the fixed labor 
requirement can differ between countries. These differences generate comparative 
advantage in the sense that the range of export industries is determined endogenously.
4 
Based on this model, I will examine the impact of two modes of economic integration:  (1)  
a reduction in iceberg trade costs, and (2)  technical standardization (i.e., narrowing 
technical heterogeneity between countries) due to information spillover. It will be shown 
that these two modes of economic integration have contrasting influences on specialization 
patterns: while trade liberalization narrows the range of industries with intra-industry trade, 
technical standardization results in a widening of the same range. 
This note is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model of monopolistic 
competition. Section 3 examines the impact of trade liberalization. Section 4 concludes the 
                                                   
4   In what follows, I use the terms “technical heterogeneity” and “comparative advantage” 
interchangeably. paper. 
 
2  The Model 
Suppose there are two countries in the world, Home and Foreign. Each country is endowed 
with  L  units of labor and the only source of income is the wage, w  () w % . There is a 
continuum of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive industries indexed by  [0,1] i∈ . 
Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences and spend equal amounts on the output of all 
industries. The quantity index of industry  i takes the form 
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where  () ni  ( () ni % ) is the number of products produced in industry i in Home (Foreign), 
() k di  ( ()
k di% ) is the quantity of product k  (k % ) in the Home market, and  1 σ >  is the 
elasticity of substitution between every pair of products. 
Trade between countries is costly. We assume that, for every t units shipped, only one 
unit arrives. Thus, the price of importing a differentiated product for Home consumers will 
be  ()
k tp i % % , where  ()
k p i % %  is the producer’s price for the  k %-th Foreign product in industry  i. 
The price index of industry  i can be obtained as: 
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where  () k p i  ( ()
k p i % % ) is the price of the k  (k % )-th differentiated product produced by 
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where  () E i  is the expenditure level for industry  i varieties (
1
0 () i E id i w L = = ∫ ). 
Now turn to the cost structure of firms. In each industry in a country, technology is 
identical among firms. To produce  ( ) x i  units of products,  ( ) ( ) ix i α β +  units of labor are 
required. While the marginal labor requirement  β  is identical among industries, the fixed 
labor requirement  () i α  differs among industries. I allow that for cross-country technical 
heterogeneity in fixed labor requirements. I also assume that industries can be ranked 
unambiguously in terms of their fixed labor requirements. In this note I concentrate on one 
convenient special case in which the fixed labor requirements in both country vary linearly 
with  i. The fixed labor requirements can be written as follows: 
( ) ( ) (1 2 ) ,                                                   (5)
( ) ( 1 ) (1 2 ) ,                                              (6)










Figure  1   illustrates these relationships. I concentrate on the case of “symmetric 
comparative advantage.”
5 Parameter γ  measures the degree of technical standardization: 
an increase in  γ  corresponds to the case in which technology becomes more standardized, 
which is depicted as a movement from the solid lines to the dotted lines in Figure 1. 
                                                   
5 Based on a general oligopolistic equilibrium model, Neary (2003) also explores the case of symmetric 
comparative advantage. 
 With the number of firms being very large, the elasticity of demand for each product 
becomes  σ . Thus, each product is priced at a markup over marginal cost:
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I chose units so that  (1 ) / β σσ =− , which implies that  () p iw =  and  () p iw = %% . Free entry 
ensures that the equilibrium output per firm is constant, but differs across countries, and 
independent of the level of trade costs: 
( ) ( ) ,                                                          (9)








The production technologies are mirror images of each other. By virtue of market 
symmetry, factor prices will be equalized among countries:  ww = % . I chose this equalized 
wage rate as unity. 
Product market equilibrium requires that supply equal demand for each product: 




− ≡  (01 τ ≤≤) yields the following equilibrium condition for a Home 
product and its Foreign counterpart in industry  i: 
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Its solution is 
                                                   
6 Hereafter, the subscript  k  is dropped for simplicity. 1
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Let us suppose that the following condition is satisfied for industry  i: 
() ()













Then all the denominators in  (13)  and (14)  are positive. The difference in the number of 
firms in industry  i is 
2 [ ( ) ( )](1 )
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It is positive when  () () ii α α > %  and  (15)  are satisfied. This implies that the degree of 
specialization will depend on both the level of trade cost  t, and the level of differences in 
the fixed labor requirement (or technical heterogeneity). 
 
3  The Impact of Economic Integration 
By combining  (15)  and (16) , we can obtain two cutoff points determining specialization 
patterns: 
[( ) / ( ) ] , ii i τ αα = %  
[( ) / ( ) ] . ii i τ αα = %  
Only Home will produce products for industries in the range  0 ii ≤ ≤ , while only Foreign 
firms are active in industries in the range  1 ii ≤ ≤ . Within the range of iii << , both countries’ firms are active and intra-industry trade occurs between countries. In contrast to 
the findings in the previous literature, we found that intra-industry trade occurs in the 
middle range of industries. 
 
3.1  Trade Liberalization 
Now we turn to the impact of trade liberalization, which is captured by a decrease in  t (i.e., 
an increase in τ ). The reduction of trade costs has two effects. First, trade liberalization 
intensifies import competition: a fall in  t reduces the industry price index due to the extra 
firms competing for a share of a limited domestic market demand ((3)). This leads to a fall 
in domestic demand for domestically produced products in each country. The industry price 
indices fall more in less competitive industries (i.e., industries with a relatively high fixed 
labor requirement) since firms with larger fixed costs are exposed to more import 
competition than firms with lower fixed costs ((16)). Second, trade liberalization makes it 
easier to gain access to the export market: a fall in  t leads to an increase in exports to each 
country. The relative strength of the two effects determines equilibrium trade patterns: the 
import competition effect dominates since sales in the domestic market are more significant 
than exports in the presence of positive trade costs. Firms with relatively high fixed costs 
find the gain in exports does not offset the sales lost in the domestic market so the amount 
of output they can sell is insufficient to cover (higher) fixed costs and this leads to the exit 
of some firms in the sectors with a comparative disadvantage. The reverse is true for the 
firms with relatively low fixed costs, so there is entry in the sectors that enjoy a 
comparative advantage. Summarizing these changes, the difference in the number of firms becomes larger (see, 
(16) ): trade liberalization induces international specialization due to comparative 
advantage (i.e., technical heterogeneity). Furthermore, due to liberalization, Foreign (resp. 
Home) firms will be wiped out in sectors around i (resp. i ): the range of sectors with 
intra-industry trade will become narrower (see Figure  2). 
Proposition 1:  Due to trade liberalization, specialization resulting from technical 
heterogeneity is enhanced and the range of sectors with intra-industry trade becomes 
narrower. 
 
3.2  Technical Standardization 
Next, let us consider the effect of increasing information flows across countries and a 
consequent standardization in production technology. The effect of technical 
standardization is captured by an increase in γ .
7 From (5),  (6) and Figure 1, increases 
in  γ   imply less technical heterogeneity among countries. Then, at some marginal 
industries around ii >  (ii < ), Home (Foreign) firms begin to produce and export. Thus, 
this change causes the range of industries with intra-industry trade to widen (see Figure  2). 
Proposition 2: Due to technical standardization, the range of sectors with intra-industry 
                                                   
7 In the literature on endogenous growth, it is often assumed that closer economic integration can be 
achieved by increasing trade in goods or increasing the flow of ideas across countries. See, for example, 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). 
 trade becomes wider. 
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
Based on a many-industry monopolistic competition trade model with iceberg trade costs, 
this note discusses the impact of two modes of economic integration: (1)  a reduction in 
trade costs, and (2)  technical standardization due to information spillover. It has been 
shown that these two modes of economic integration have contrasting effects on 
specialization patterns: while trade liberalization narrows the range of industries with 
intra-industry trade, technical standardization results in the widening of that range. These 
results cannot be obtained under the assumption that both two-goods and technical 
homogeneity. This implies that it is important to extend the standard model of monopolistic 
competition to include both technical heterogeneity and many sectors. 
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Economic Integration and Equilibrium Specialization Patterns   